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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION:
A LEGAL VIEW
By ROGER C. CRAMTON
University of Michigan

Some time ago I came across a quotation which ever since has been
weighing on my mind. It is reported to have been spoken by an aged
West Coast Indian, sitting on a rock and looking out to sea, under circumstances which I do not know. It reads as follows: "Lighthouse,him
no good for fog. Lighthouse, him whistle, him blow, him ring bell, him
flash light, him raise hell; but fog come in just the same."'
At the risk of oversimplification,I plan to weave my remarks around
three untested assertions, each of which will requiresome amplification.
First, many regulatory actions which are of great interest and concern
to lawyers have little or no economic significance. Second, under our
system the exercise of regulatory power bearing directly upon private
individuals will not ordinarily be tolerated unless subjected to procedural safeguards. And third, economic regulation, even where public
policy is fairly clear and the regulatory task is confined, faces enduring
problems which limit its potential effectiveness. In the transportation
industries, where clear objectives do not exist, the governing principle
is one of ambiguousprotectionism,a form of economic regulation which
has demonstrated characteristic infirmities.
The most basic question one can ask about economic regulation is
whether it makes a differencein the behavior of the regulated industry.
The lawyer is tempted to answer this inquiry by condensing the voluminous mass of decisions and regulations into an orderly analysis of
regulatory policies. But, as George Stigler has pointed out,2 the enumeration of an endless succession of regulatory actions provides proof,
not of effective regulation, but of the desire to regulate. The net effect
of the busy humming of the regulatory machinery may be only to
irritate entrepreneurs and to enrich their lawyers, without effecting a
fundamental alteration in the state of affairs that would have existed
in the absence of regulation.
A moment's thought will indicate why the economic effect of regulation is essentially independent of the content of formal regulation.
'The source of the quotation is W. L. Prosser, "Lighthouse No Good," 1 J. of Legal Ed.,
257 (1948).
2 George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, "What Can Regulators Regulate?: The Case of
Electricity" (unpublished paper delivered to the Economics Club of the University of
Michigan in March, 1963).
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The regulation may prohibit conduct which no one desires to engage in
or it may encourage conduct which will take place anyway. Even if the
regulation deals with conduct that would take a different course in the
absence of regulation, it is always possible that the objective so devoutly desired by the regulators will not be achieved. The regulatory
machinery may be too cumbersome or the ingenuity of circumvention
too great. In order to determine whether the observed economic behavior in a particular industry is due to the existence of regulation, the
possible effect of regulationmust be isolated from other factors influencing behavior.
The significance of individual regulatory actions cannot be judged
by the number of lawyels or regulators engaged in the fray, the heat of
the battle, or the length of the struggle. These external indicia have little
relationship to the economic significance of the proceeding. It is a safe
generalization that many of the most time-consuming and expensive
controversiesin regulatory annals have had little economic or social significance-other than as tribal rites which lend legitimacy to conduct
that otherwise might be viewed as antisocial behavior. On the other
hand, some regulatory actions, which may or may not be accompanied
by formal proceedings, elaborate trappings,and controversialpublicity,
are of great economic importance.
Two separate functions of the Federal CommunicationsCommission
illustrate the differing significance of regulatory actions. The firstallocation of the radio spectrum to various uses-is a function of enormous importance that determines the manner in which this resource is
used by society. The Commission decides whether or not a frequency
will be made available to citizens, such as trucking companies or ham
operators, who desire to utilize the airwaves to connect their far-flung
activities, to while away their leisure time, or to accomplish a thousand
other purposes. If a frequency is made available for a particular purpose, the nature of the frequency and the terms on which it may be
used determine the cost of the desired service to the user. It is not an
accident that we have three and only three television networks. The
Commission, by its actions in allocating frequencies for television use,
has created a situation in which there are very few metropolitancenters
possessing more than three competitive television channels.3Until this
situation is remedied and a fourth or fifth station added in all or most
metropolitancenters, the structure of the television industry will remain
unchanged.
In sharp contrast to frequency allocation, the numerouscomparative
licensing proceedings in radio and television conducted by the Commis'The relevant materials are collected and discussed in Note, "The Darkened Channels:
UHF Television and the FCC," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1578 (1962).
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sion have little economic significance. Comparativehearings provide a
bonanza to the successful applicant, dissipate the energies of regulators,
and attract the attention of scholars and critics. Yet it is doubtful that
they have any substantial effect on the conduct of broadcasters.
Why is this so? In part it is because the criteria for choosing the
"best" applicant are not meaningful.4A second factor is that the policies
applied in comparative hearings may be and are undercut by uncontested initial grants or subsequent station transfers.5But a more fundamental reason is that the economic conditions which influence the
actual conduct of broadcastersremain unchanged.
Broadcasters operate their stations in order to make money. The
pattern of operation which will maximize the revenues of a particular
station will not vary, regardless of who is awarded the station. The
licensee of a television station, for example, will obtain the most favorable network affiliation that is available to him and he will carry a large
proportion of network programs. Decisions concerning which network
programs will be carried and what other programs will be offered will
be made on economic grounds. Experienced broadcasters faced with
identical conditions will reach roughly similar results. Comparative
licensing does not affect these underlying conditions; the only practical
effect is a substantial delay in the initiation of additional service to the
affected community.
Of course, where the number of licenses is limited some method of
distributing them to qualified applicants must be established. Alternatives that would accomplish this task in a less wasteful and more desirable mnannerinclude public bidding, grant to the first applicant in
point of time, and administrative discretion. Ronald Coase has argued
persuasively that the market system is best adapted to determine how
many frequencies should be devoted to broadcasting uses and who
should be entitled to operate on each frequency.6 The broadcasters
and the Commission, as well as most commentators, have neither understood nor seriously considered this proposal. Their efforts have
been directed at better definition of the criteria by which the "best"
broadcaster is chosen. Yet, even if more objective standards can be
developed, which seems doubtful, the effort expended in comparative
hearings will be wasted as long as the policies applied in such hearings
'For useful critical discussions of the substantive and procedural aspects of comparative
broadcast licensing, see Henry J. Friendly, "The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need
for Better Definition of Standards," 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 1055-72 (1962); Administrative
Confereince of the United States, Committee on Licenses and Authorizations, "Licensing of
Major Broadcast Facilities by the Federal Communications Commission" (rev. draft September, 1962) (prepared by William K. Jones, Columbia Law School).
5About 90 percent of all commercial television stations authorized in mid-1961 resulted
from uncontested initial grants ratlher than comparative proceedings. License transfer occurs
on a large scale: over 10 percent of outstaniding licenses are sold each year.
'R. H. Coase, "Federal Communications Commission," 2 J. of Law and Econ. 1 (1959).
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can be easily circumvented, and, in any event, do not affect the economic conditions faced by the individual broadcaster. Any attempt
to restrict these flexible avenues for prompt service and new entry is
likely to be a cure worse than the disease. Individualized licensing
proceedings are not the appropriate method of dealing with the fundamental conditions which influence the conduct of broadcasters. To the
extent that there is agreement on policies which broadcasters should
follow-such as a minimum amount of public affairs programmingor
limits on the degree of commercialization-such policies can be effectively and directly implemented by general regulations applicable to
all broadcasters, with license revocation as the ultimate sanction for
noncompliance.
A similar analysis may be applied to other areas of regulation. Some
regulatory actions affect the structure of the industry or the behavior
of its firms; others affect only the fortunes of the individual participants. Decisions involving the extent and nature of competition to be
permitted in a particular market have considerable economic significance. But if it has already been decided that there will be three and
only three air carriers (or motor carriers) in a particular market, the
choice of the particular carrier, standing by itself, is unlikely to make
much difference. If there are going to be only three airlines operating
between New York and Atlanta, does it really matter to the public
whether the third service is rendered by Braniff or Delta?
II
As noted above, under our system the exercise of government power
bearing directly on private individuals will not be tolerated unless subjected to procedural safeguards.7Legal tradition tends to be individualistic and negative in its approach to economic regulation. "Lawyers,"it
has been said, "focus on the fact that public officials and tribunals are
going to be fallible at best and incompetent or abusive at worst."8Traditional legal principles serve to limit discretion by providing the
official with as little elbow room as possible for error, whimsey, or bias.
Extended hearings allow interested persons to contribute to the decider's knowledge; the written decision must elaborate the reasons for
choice by reference to the legislative standard; and court review is
available to insure that procedural requirements and statutory limitations are observed. One cannot speak of law in our society-or "the
rule of law"-without including procedures which allow citizens to
I
For the argument at this point I am indebted to the excellent piece by Louis L. Jaffe,
"The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process," 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1954).
8 Kingman Brewster, "Enforceable Competition: Unruly Reason or Reasonable Rules,"
A.E.R., May, 1955, pp. 482, 484.
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participate in a meaningful way in governmental decisions which bear
directly upon them as individuals.
It is often contended, especially by nonlawyers, that judicial attitudes
and processes, with their emphasis on adversary presentation of evidence, cross-examination,and contentious record-building,are unsuited
to the implementation of broad public policies by regulatory agencies.
There is often justification for the charge that judicialized procedures
are applied thoughtlessly to functions to the solution of which they do
not contribute. In my judgment, the comparative hearing in broadcast
licensing is one such instance.
There is room for legitimate difference of opinion concerning the
point at which the increased accuracy of formal decisions, when contrasted with summary decisions, is offset by their relative inefficiency.
Yet there is little room for doubt that the citizen, regardless of relative
efficiency, finds summary discretion distasteful and unacceptable when
applied to his own concerns. If he is to be excluded from a particular
activity or if the retuirnwhich his property may earn is to be controlled
on individual grounds, he demands an opportunity to participate in the
making of the decision. Our legislatures reflect this democratic choice
when they insist, in statute after statute after statute, that regulatory
powers be exercised only after full hearings. As long as this preference
prevails, the procedure which it demands will constitute a limiting condition on economic regulation.
III
There are inherent limitations on the effectiveness of economic regulation even where public policy is fairly clear and the regulatory task,
relatively speaking, is confined and manageable. The simpler case of
economic regulation-the determination of maximum rates of a conventional public utility-has not been performed with obvious success.
I do not assert that public utility regulation has been a failure. I do
maintain, however, that unqualifiedassertions of its effectiveness would
be unwarranted.The lesson of a half-century of experience is that the
environment generates enduring problems which limit the potential
effectiveness of rate regulation.
The regulation of interstate telephone rates by the Federal Communications Commission during the period 1953 through 1962 illustrates the general proposition.9The objectives are clear and limited;
9Congressional investigations have resulted in the publication of a great deal of material
relating to interstate telephone regulation, including internal memoranda prepared by the
FCC staff for the Commission. See Hearings on the Antitrust Problems of the Satellite
Communications System Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1962); Antitrust Subcommittee of
the House Judiciary Committee, Report on Consent Decree Program of the Department
of Justice, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 73-83 (1959); Hearings on the Consent Decree Program of
the Department of Justice Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 3427-570 (1958).
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and the methods are traditional and well established. Yet a detailed
look at the methods and mechanics of regulation suggests strong doubts
concerning its effectiveness: disputed issues have been compromised
by the Commission after private negotiation with the Bell System;
standards for determining allowable expense, items includible in investment, and cost of capital have never been determined; and a relatively high rate of return of 7.5 percent over an extended period has
encouraged investors to treat A. T. & T. stock as a growth rather tlhan
as an income security. The FCC has never even explained or attempted
to justify this state of affairs.
I do not offer this as a demonstrationof the ineffectiveness of federal
telephone regulation. My thesis is that this pattern is typical, that
doubts of similar dimension could be raised concerningthe performance
of nearly all regulatory schemes. Why is this so? What are the limiting
conditions on the effectiveness of economic regulation that emerge from
the task itself or that are imposed by the environment in which it
operates?
I have spoken of the relative simplicity of conventional public utility
regulation in that its purposes are fairly clear and its methods well established. Public utility regulation is made a manageable function by
the ability to treat each company as a separate unit subject to detailed
accounting regulations. In addition, most areas of conventional public
utility regulation are shielded in varying degrees from the disruptive
effect of outside influences, such as competition from unregulated substitutes. Even so, the complexity of the regulatory task is staggering.
The treatment of joint costs in the telephone industry or the explanation
of the toll rate disparity between interstate and intrastate rates are
problems that tax the abilities of able economists.10It is easy to underestimate the difficulty of the problems if one is not responsible for the
results nor embarrassed by an overabundanceof information.
Inadequacies of personnel and appropriations constitute a second
limiting factor that seems to be endemic. A handful of poorly paid
employees are asked to perform complex tasks of regulation requiring
zeal and imagination. Before long nearly all of the available manpower
is tied down in the processing or review of routine matters. Once the
immediate needs which produced regulation have been assuaged, the
public loses interest and the agency falls into a routine in which dayto-day accommodationsare made with those subject to the regulation.
A third limiting factor, already mentioned, is the inertia resulting
from the agencies' limited power under typical statutory provisions to
take decisive action without extensive formal proceedings. Indeed,
10 See the study by Leland L. Johnson, Communications Satellites and Telephone Rates:
Problems of Government Regulation (prepared for NASA by the RAND Corp. and reprinted in Hearings on the Antitrust Problems of the Satellite Communications System
Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 603-52, 1962).
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many agencies are unable to defeat proposals of others without a decision based on a formal hearing and record. Yet formal proceedings
have their virtues; and their legislative popularity assures that they
will be with us for a long time.
Thus far public utility and broadcast regulation have been used as
vehicles for stating several rather simple theses. I now move to transportation regulation, a field where the overlay of legislative objectives
and administrative authority is hydra headed and more complex. This
is the arena of "ambiguous protectionism": that unnatural state in
which the salt of competition is joined in uneasy mixture with the
pepper of protectionism and the whole porridge seasoned with the
paprika of subsidy and promotion. Experience with various forms of
ambiguous protectionism over several decades is now sufficient so that
some of its characteristic infirmities can be stated: (1) lack of a clear
legislative mandate tends to stultify administration; (2) the passive
functions of protectionismtend to be implementedmore effectively than
the affirmative functions of development and coordination; and (3)
competition from alternative forms of transport that are exempt, unregulated, or promoted by another agency tends to limit even the
effective performance of protective functions.
1. The objectives of ICC regulation of domestic surface transportation are typical in that they reflect several disparate objectives. The
earliest objectives-the protection of shippers from unreasonable
charges and unjust discrimination-have a procompetitive flavor, but
they have become less important as competition has tended to replace
monopoly in transportation. More recent regulation is based on the
premise that unrestrained competition in the transport field will produce harmful results; transport companiesmust be protected from their
own mistakes and their competitors' greed. The Commission was given
a vague mandate to displace carrier judgments in order to protect
carrier revenues, coordinate the transportation system, and preserve
certain historic policies which favor the broad movement of commodities, affect the location of industry, and allow or require the continuance
of unremunerativeservices.
After the first years of regulation, when the initial enthusiasm has
been replaced by a convenient reliance on routine solutions, the vague
mandate-expressed in terms of some undefined "public interest"-is
likely to produce a timid and unimaginative approach. Agency members, who are readily identifiable and exposed to attack, are reluctant
to assume tasks of national planning which they or others may feel
are beyond their competence or commission. Lack of a clear legislative
mandate stultifies administration.
2. The so-called "independence"of the regulatory agency is a source
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of weakness when the agency is not implementing policies that find
strong support in a democratic consensus. Isolated from the sources of
political power, forced to evolve working arrangements with those it
regulates, dependent on Congress for funds and on the President for
reappointment, and harassed by an unending succession of congressional investigations and industry pressures, the agency withdraws
from committing itself on decisive issues of policy. It drifts along, responding to the most urgent pressures as they arise and perpetuating,
for the most part, regulatory patterns which were created in the past to
meet different problems. In short, the agency becomes passive, backward-looking,and resistant to change.
An important implication of these general tendencies is that the more
passive functions of protectionism are more effectively implemented
than the affirmativefunctions of planning, development, and coordination. The ICC, for example, has been notably ineffective in achieving
affirmative goals of coordination and efficiency. Its powers and procedures and the practicalities of their use limit it to a negative and
restraining role. If it desires to restructure the transportation system
to ameliorate the problems of the New Haven, it is cast in the role of
passing on a merger of the New York Central and the Pennsy-not
exactly the proposal that it was likely to have had in mind. The ICC,
by expending most of its resources in formal hearings devoted to such
matters, can negative carrier proposals which threaten the status quo;
but, like other transportation agencies, it lacks the powers, resources,
or inclination to formulate and implement affirmative programs. The
Commission, understandably, concentrates its energies on the most
manageable and specific of the tasks assigned to it by the legislature:
protecting interests created in the past and moderating the effects of
undesirable change. The Commission's attempts to prevent or ameliorate departures from the existing rate structure and traffic pattern-a
kind of soft-hearted and backward-lookingcartelism-indicate its true
purpose and function as a conservative body fighting a rearguard action against the inevitable forces of change.
3. It is ironic that even the regulatory function that is performed
most effectively in the transportation field-that of protecting established carriers from new competition-is hedged about with statutory
provisions and jurisdictional limitations which impair its effectiveness.
The provision for "grandfatherrights" to carriers in business when the
Motor Carrier Act was passed meant that the existing structure of the
industry, which allegedly was characterized by instability and oversupply, would be perpetuated.'1 Moreover, each carrier possesses an
" See Note, "FederalRegulation of Trucking: The EmergingCritique,"63 Colum. L.
Rev., 460 (1963).
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unlimited right to expand by adding new equipment and service along
its certified routes. With a large number of firms already in existence,
control of the number of trucks would be necessary in order to remedy
the purported evil of chronic oversupply. Nor is the Commission
grantedany power to rectify mistakes made in grantingoperatingrights;
licenses can be revoked only for repeatedand willful violations.
Absence of regulatory controls over local carriers, private carriers,
and haulers of agricultural commodities-together constituting more
than half of truck transportation-means that at best ICC policies can
be only partially effective. Finally, the relatively free transferability of
operating rights allows new blood to enter the industry and provides
an opportunity for expansion on the part of aggressive operators.
These limiting factors suggest an argument that transportationregulation may be tolerable because of its ineffectiveness. There has always
been a substantial amount of competition within each transportation
industry. The division of responsibility among a number of jealous
agencies, each adopting a paternal attitude toward the carriers under
its wing, assures strong intermodal rivalry. And in any event, the availability of unregulated alternatives-exempt, unregulated, and private
carriage-limits the market power of the regulated common carriers.
These circumstances introduce a substantial dose of free market discipline into transportation markets. The record of performance in the
transportation industries justifies the assertion that the present halfway house, despite its deficiencies, is superior to the more effective protectionism that would be the only likely result of centralized control
and broader authority over the transportation industries, the proposal
that is concealed under slogans of the need for increased "coordination"
and "integration"in transportation.
But surely it is a counsel of despair to argue that this great nation
has blunderedits way into a compromisebetween competition and regulation which is tolerable because other alternatives might be worse. The
existing regulatory schemes undoubtedly have produced a substantial
misallocation of resources. Public aids have distorted the terms of intermodal competition. Regulatory support of high common carrier rates
has contributed to the dramatic growth of private and unregulated carriage. Attempts to preserve the existing pattern of traffic allocation
have prevented the railroads from full utilization of the economies of
scale of their existing capacity. Trends toward concentration through
merger and toward semicartelization through the activities of rate
bureaus have been encouraged.
Economic regulation, like other tools of governmental control of
society, has characteristic virtues and vices. When the objectives to be
achieved are clear and precise, techniques for their realization can
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usually be designed. The task is not easy and the results are not foreordained. But the job can be done. When the blunderbuss, however, is
substituted for the rifle and a potpourri of vague or inconsistent objectives is thrown into regulatory safe-keeping, the results are likely to
be limited to the protection of established interests or to be wholly unpredictable. Regardless of defects or unintended consequences, a regulatory scheme is likely to generate interests that make deregulation extremely difficult. Increased attention to the problem of accomplishing
discrete regulatory objectives in the most limited fashion, disturbing
other relations as little as possible and avoiding unintended consequences, would pay great dividends. The lighthouse can and does perform essential tasks; but it cannot be expected to keep out the fog.

